Millions of migrant workers from Bangladesh live and work in the Middle East, forming one of the largest expatriate communities in the region. Given the scale of this diaspora, its predominantly low-wage profile, and the long presence of extremist organisations in West Asia, conventional assumptions would suggest a high vulnerability to radicalisation. Yet empirical evidence points in the opposite direction. Bangladeshis have contributed strikingly few foreign fighters to Middle Eastern terror groups. Understanding why this has been so—and why this may now be changing—offers important insights into the interaction between migration, ideology, political context, and social resilience.
The Scale and Economic Significance of the Bangladeshi Diaspora
An estimated 5–7 million Bangladeshis work across Gulf and Middle Eastern countries, making them the third-largest expatriate group after Indians and Pakistanis. Unlike the Indian diaspora, which spans high-skilled professionals to blue-collar workers, Bangladeshis are overwhelmingly concentrated in low-wage sectors such as construction, transport, factory work, domestic service, cleaning, and security.
Despite modest earnings, this workforce sustains Bangladesh’s economy through remittances of around $25 billion annually—roughly 6–7% of GDP. Remittances exceed export earnings, underpin foreign exchange reserves, stabilise the taka, and fuel domestic consumption and investment. In economic terms, migrant labour has been a pillar of macroeconomic stability for Bangladesh.
An Unexpected Pattern of Low Radicalisation
Given regional instability and the presence of extremist organisations such as ISIL and Al-Qaida in the Middle East, the Bangladeshi diaspora might appear an easy recruitment pool. Yet proven cases of Bangladeshis joining such groups are remarkably few—estimated at just 30–40 individuals.
This contrasts sharply with other nationalities. Indonesia, with fewer than one million workers in the Middle East, is estimated to have contributed up to 700 foreign fighters. Malaysia, with only about 50,000 workers, may have contributed over 150. Smaller ethnic groups from the Russian Caucasus—Chechens, Dagestanis, Ingush—have supplied several thousand fighters. The Bangladeshi case thus represents a notable outlier.
Domestic Extremism Without Mass Appeal
This low overseas radicalisation is all the more striking because Bangladesh has not been free of domestic extremist organisations. Groups such as Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, Ansarullah Bangla Team, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh, and others have carried out bombings and targeted attacks, culminating in the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka.
Political Islam has also had an organised presence. Parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Hefazat-e-Islam, and Islami Andolan Bangladesh have shaped ideological discourse. Yet, electorally, hardline religious parties have rarely crossed 10% of the vote share, peaking briefly in 1991 and declining thereafter. This limited mass appeal reduced the baseline level of grievance or ideological mobilisation among ordinary Bangladeshis, including migrants.
Historical and Cultural Buffers Against Extremism
Bangladesh’s founding itself provides an important clue. The country emerged in 1971 by rejecting the Two-Nation Theory that prioritised religion over language and culture. Bengali identity, with its strong traditions of literature, art, music, and social pluralism, has historically moderated religious extremism.
This cultural orientation fostered social cohesion, inclusivism, and a form of everyday humanism. Even economically marginal migrants carried with them these social norms. In the Gulf, Bangladeshis acquired a reputation for reliability, discipline, and trustworthiness—often viewed more positively than even Indian or Pakistani workers. Such social embedding reduced alienation, a key driver of radicalisation among migrant populations elsewhere.
Political Context and the Role of the State
For over a decade, Bangladesh under maintained a firm stance against extremist organisations, even as her government drew criticism for democratic backsliding. This political containment limited the expansion of radical networks and curtailed their transnational spillover.
Even when student protests erupted against authoritarian tendencies, they were not initially religion-driven. However, the current political transition—under a caretaker arrangement led by Muhammad Yunus—has altered the balance. Religious forces have emerged as influential actors within protest movements and transitional politics.
Signals of a Shifting Ideological Landscape
Recent surveys underscore this shift. The International Republican Institute reported up to a 30% preference for hardline Islamist parties, rising to nearly 37% when smaller religious parties are included—surpassing even the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Meanwhile, estimates suggest the Awami League’s support may have fallen below 20%.
If these trends persist, Bangladesh risks a deeper ideological realignment. Increased political salience of religion could erode the cultural and institutional buffers that previously insulated Bangladeshi migrants from extremist recruitment.
Why the Future May Look Different
Radicalisation is rarely driven by poverty alone. It emerges from a convergence of grievance, identity crisis, political narratives, and transnational opportunity structures. A more polarised domestic environment—marked by contested legitimacy, electoral violence, and ideological radicalisation—could reshape how Bangladeshi migrants perceive themselves abroad and how they are perceived by host societies.
As Bangladesh approaches elections amid tension and uncertainty, domestic political change is likely to translate into altered global perceptions of Bangladeshis, including in the Middle East. The very diaspora once noted for its restraint and social integration may face new vulnerabilities.
What to Note for Prelims?
- Bangladesh is one of the top three labour-sending countries to the Middle East.
- Remittances form over 6% of Bangladesh’s GDP.
- Bangladesh has had domestic extremist groups but limited electoral support for them.
- The Holey Artisan Bakery attack (2016) was a major terror incident.
What to Note for Mains?
- Why poverty alone does not explain radicalisation among migrants.
- Role of culture, identity, and state policy in countering extremism.
- Linkages between domestic political change and diaspora security.
- Implications of rising political Islam for South Asian stability.
