The return of Tarique Rahman to Dhaka after 17 years marks a turning point not only for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) but also for Bangladesh’s external posture, especially towards India. As Bangladesh moves towards the February 2026 national elections amid political churn and post-violence uncertainty, the BNP’s evolving approach to India deserves close scrutiny. Long defined by its opposition to the Awami League and scepticism of Indian influence, the BNP now finds itself recalibrating its stance in a transformed domestic and regional landscape.
Tarique Rahman’s return and political signalling
On December 25, Tarique Rahman, acting chairman and de-facto leader of the , returned to Bangladesh after a prolonged exile in the United Kingdom. Acquitted of the legal cases that had kept him away, Rahman addressed a massive rally in Dhaka, signalling the BNP’s readiness to contest power in the February 2026 elections.
His rhetoric was notable for its restraint. While acknowledging populist anxieties about external interference, he avoided overtly confrontational language and instead emphasised unity, patience, and inclusivity. This tonal shift, described by The Daily Star as a “psychological reset” for the BNP, suggests an attempt to broaden the party’s appeal beyond its traditional support base.
Origins of BNP’s scepticism towards India
To understand the BNP’s India policy, one must return to its founding under in 1978. Zia’s politics were shaped as a reaction to the policies of . With independence achieved, the BNP viewed Mujib’s domestic authoritarianism and close alignment with India as the new challenges to Bangladeshi sovereignty.
This translated into opposition to key initiatives such as the 1972 Indo-Bangla Friendship Treaty, objections to India’s perceived security influence, criticism of water-sharing arrangements linked to the Farakka Barrage, and rejection of Mujib’s emphasis on secularism. Zia sought to diversify Bangladesh’s foreign relations, strengthening ties with China and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, while reducing reliance on India.
Khaleda Zia and institutionalising distance from India
Under , the BNP’s scepticism hardened into a more systematic distancing from India. During her tenures (1991–96 and 2001–06), bilateral relations deteriorated sharply. Dhaka opposed Indian transit access, resisted cooperation on connectivity, and adopted an adversarial position on maritime and land boundary disputes.
Bangladesh under the BNP also deepened defence ties with China, signing a defence cooperation agreement in 2002, and warmed relations with Pakistan, partly influenced by alliances with Islamist parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami. India’s role in the 1971 Liberation War, in the BNP’s view, did not justify disproportionate influence over Bangladesh’s political or strategic choices.
The “Battling Begums” and BNP’s marginalisation
Until 2008, Bangladeshi politics revolved around the rivalry between Khaleda Zia and , often described as the era of the “Battling Begums”. This equilibrium collapsed after Hasina consolidated power following the 2008 elections, a period that coincided with Tarique Rahman’s exile.
Structural changes, including the abolition of the caretaker government system and elections boycotted or contested under allegations of rigging, progressively pushed the BNP out of institutional politics. Khaleda Zia’s house arrest and sustained pressure on BNP cadres further weakened the party, enabling Hasina to conclude long-pending agreements with India on boundaries, transit, and connectivity.
From ideological opposition to survival politics
Between 2008 and 2024, the BNP’s India rhetoric became intermittent and largely instrumental, peaking around election cycles but otherwise subdued. The party’s priority shifted to survival rather than foreign policy articulation. Deprived of institutional leverage, it relied on street mobilisation and alliances with anti-Hasina forces, including Islamist groups, which reinforced perceptions of an anti-India tilt.
Yet, unlike Jamaat-e-Islami, the BNP continued to assert its nationalist credentials independently, foregrounding Ziaur Rahman’s role in the 1971 resistance rather than rejecting the liberation narrative itself.
The August 2024 rupture and new political space
The political upheaval of August 2024, which forced the Awami League leadership underground or into exile, created an unprecedented opening for the BNP. For the first time, it found itself as the most experienced formal political force with room to act proactively rather than reactively.
This shift has been accompanied by visible pragmatism. The BNP has advocated early elections, distanced itself from Jamaat-e-Islami, avoided inflammatory rhetoric, and even opposed proposals to ban the Awami League. This cautious positioning reflects an effort to project responsibility and readiness to govern.
Reframing the India relationship
Crucially, this pragmatism has extended to India. Senior BNP leaders, including Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir and Tarique Rahman himself, have publicly spoken of “friendly relations” with India based on mutual respect. Statements emphasising shared history, geography, and the necessity of cooperation signal an attempt to recast BNP nationalism as pro-Bangladesh rather than explicitly anti-India.
Expressions of gratitude towards Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for concern over Khaleda Zia’s health further underscore this recalibration.
Continuities and constraints ahead
Despite this tonal shift, structural fault lines remain. Water-sharing disputes, particularly with the Ganges treaty expiring in 2026, Bangladesh’s engagement with Pakistan, and the unresolved political future of Sheikh Hasina continue to constrain bilateral trust. Domestic populism and competition with Islamist actors also limit how far the BNP can soften its India posture.
Moreover, regional polarisation, including renewed India–Pakistan tensions, and the emergence of new political actors within Bangladesh add layers of uncertainty for any future government in Dhaka.
What to note for Prelims?
- Role of BNP and Awami League in Bangladesh’s political history.
- Indo-Bangla Friendship Treaty (1972) and Farakka Barrage issue.
- Key leaders: Ziaur Rahman, Khaleda Zia, Sheikh Hasina, Tarique Rahman.
What to note for Mains?
- Evolution of BNP’s foreign policy towards India.
- Impact of domestic political consolidation on India–Bangladesh relations.
- Challenges and opportunities for India in engaging a post-Hasina Bangladesh.
