India’s long-running constitutional friction over Governors delaying assent to State Bills took a dramatic turn in 2025. In April, the Supreme Court appeared to decisively curb gubernatorial obstructionism. Yet, within months, an advisory opinion on a Presidential Reference diluted that very discipline, reopening questions about legislative supremacy, federal balance, and judicial consistency.
The April 2025 Breakthrough on Delayed Assent
In “State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu” (April 2025), the Supreme Court directly addressed a persistent problem: Governors indefinitely sitting on Bills passed by elected State legislatures. Treating such inaction as constitutionally suspect, the Court:
- Imposed definitive timelines for Governors to act on Bills.
- Held that unexplained delay could invite judicial intervention.
- Allowed courts, in extreme cases, to treat prolonged inaction as “deemed assent”.
For Opposition-ruled States, often locked in political contestation with Raj Bhavan, this ruling promised relief from policy paralysis and reaffirmed the primacy of elected legislatures in the law-making process.
Why the Judgment Mattered for Federal Democracy
The April verdict sought to rebalance Centre–State relations by ensuring that Article 200 of the Constitution did not become an instrument of political veto. By enforcing timelines, the Court converted the Governor’s role from a passive gatekeeper into a time-bound constitutional functionary. Silence and delay, earlier used as tools of obstruction, were rendered constitutionally untenable.
The Presidential Reference and the Sudden Retreat
Before States could operationalise this discipline, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in “Special Reference No. 1 of 2025”. Responding to the President’s query, a Constitution Bench took a markedly different approach:
- Judicially imposed timelines were said to lack textual support in the Constitution.
- The idea of “deemed assent” was termed incompatible with the constitutional scheme.
- The discretionary powers of Governors and the President were described as elastic enough to accommodate delays.
Though advisory opinions do not formally overrule judgments, their persuasive authority—especially from a Constitution Bench—cannot be ignored.
Article 200 and the Idea of ‘Constitutional Dialogue’
The Reference opinion framed Article 200 as enabling a “constitutional dialogue” between the Governor and the State legislature. However, dialogue presupposes timely and meaningful response. Critics argue that by tolerating prolonged silence, the Court has legitimised a one-sided conversation where the Governor can stall legislation without consequence, reducing accountability in the law-making process.
Reconsidered Bills and the Emerging ‘Black Hole’
A particularly contentious aspect concerns the first proviso to Article 200. Its plain text suggests that when a legislature re-enacts a Bill returned for reconsideration, the Governor must assent. The April judgment respected this finality. The Reference opinion, however, allows Governors to refer even reconsidered Bills to the President, effectively:
- Negating the binding force of legislative reiteration.
- Creating a procedural limbo where Bills can be indefinitely escalated.
- Weakening an explicit constitutional safeguard.
This interpretation departs from both textual clarity and earlier judicial restraint.
Checks, Balances, and a Questionable Equivalence
Invoking “checks and balances”, the Court justified expanded gubernatorial discretion on the ground that legislatures might pass unconstitutional or repugnant laws. The flaw in this reasoning lies in equivalence: unconstitutional laws can always be challenged in courts, but denial or delay of assent lacks an effective remedy. Elevating assent to a quasi-judicial scrutiny risks converting a procedural role into a substantive veto.
Broader Implications for Centre–State Relations
The Reference opinion revives long-standing concerns raised before bodies like the Sarkaria Commission about Governors acting as agents of the Union rather than neutral constitutional heads. By granting unfettered discretion to refer Bills—even after reconsideration—the judgment risks reinforcing perceptions of Union dominance and weakening cooperative federalism.
What to Note for Prelims?
- Article 200: Governor’s options on State Bills.
- Difference between binding judgments and advisory opinions under Article 143.
- Concept of “deemed assent” and its constitutional debate.
- Role of Governors in India’s federal structure.
What to Note for Mains?
- Critically examine the impact of gubernatorial discretion on legislative supremacy.
- Discuss how judicial interpretations shape Centre–State relations.
- Analyse the tension between constitutional text, judicial innovation, and federal principles.
- Evaluate whether the doctrine of checks and balances can justify legislative obstruction.
