Current Affairs

General Studies Prelims

General Studies (Mains)

Greenland, Trump and the End of Atlantic Certainty

Greenland, Trump and the End of Atlantic Certainty

The immediate crisis over Greenland may have subsided, but the shockwaves it sent through global geopolitics will linger. When US President Donald Trump publicly flirted with the idea of annexing Greenland — even hinting at the use of force against a NATO ally — he exposed a deeper rupture in the trans-Atlantic order. Europe now faces an uncomfortable truth: the security architecture it has relied upon for over seven decades can no longer be taken for granted.

What exactly happened over Greenland?

Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, suddenly found itself at the centre of a geopolitical storm after President suggested that the United States should acquire it, citing American national security. He argued that Greenland was strategically vital due to:

  • Its Arctic location amid growing Russian and Chinese interest.
  • Untapped mineral resources.
  • Its suitability for hosting components of the proposed “Golden Dome” missile defence system.

The United States already maintains a military presence at Greenland’s Pituffik Space Base under a 1951 treaty with Denmark. Yet Trump went further, insisting that true security requires ownership — a logic that alarmed allies across Europe.

Why this rattled NATO’s foundations

For the first time, a US president openly threatened a fellow member of the . The episode cast doubt on Washington’s commitment to NATO’s cornerstone — Article 5, the collective self-defence clause.

Trump has previously questioned whether the US should defend allies who, in his view, contribute too little. During the Greenland standoff, he even refused to rule out withdrawing from NATO altogether. Such statements undermined the alliance’s credibility more severely than any external threat.

Davos and the sense of a shifting world order

The unease was palpable at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney spoke of a “rupture” in the global order — a sentiment widely echoed by European leaders. While Trump later announced a vague “framework” agreement and backed away from military and tariff threats, the damage was already done.

The episode confirmed that NATO, as Europeans have known it since the Cold War, is entering a phase of irreversible transformation.

Europe’s awakening: from dependence to resolve

For decades, Europe subcontracted its security to Washington. Trump’s aggression forced a reassessment. In response:

  • The European Parliament suspended ratification of a trade agreement with the US.
  • EU leaders discussed counter-tariffs and invoking the bloc’s anti-coercion instrument.
  • A Danish pension fund announced plans to offload $100 million in US Treasuries.

Under the leadership of figures like Emmanuel Macron, Europe began to test its collective muscle — economically and politically.

Why Trump is not an anomaly

It would be a mistake for Europe to view this crisis as solely about Trump. His “America First” worldview resonates deeply within the MAGA movement, and a successor could well carry the same instincts. Even a future Democratic administration is likely to prioritise China over Europe.

The implications are stark: regardless of who occupies the White House, US strategic focus is drifting away from Europe.

Can Europe defend itself without the US?

By conventional metrics — population, GDP, technological capacity — Europe has the means to ensure its own security. Defence spending trends reinforce this reality:

  • In 2014, only two NATO countries met the 2% of GDP defence target.
  • By 2025, all European NATO members had reached it, with six spending over 3%.
  • Combined European defence spending (excluding the US) reached $608 billion — over four times Russia’s military budget.

Russia, despite its bluster, has revealed its limitations through its costly and grinding war in Ukraine.

The eastern flank dilemma and Ukraine’s role

Sceptics — particularly in Poland and the Baltic states — remain unconvinced that Europe can deter Russia alone. Their concerns are not unfounded. Yet a credible European strategy could involve:

  • Long-term defence partnerships with Ukraine.
  • Training Ukrainian forces and integrating them into European security planning.
  • Joint weapons production and modernisation of defence industries.

Such measures would strengthen Europe’s eastern flank without reliance on American guarantees.

The real challenge: political will

Europe’s greatest weakness is not material capacity but political fragmentation. Acting in unison is difficult among sovereign states. Yet the European Union itself proves that deep integration is possible when necessity demands it.

Defence autonomy will require:

  • Reducing duplication in weapons production.
  • Pooling resources based on comparative advantage.
  • Heavy investment in air power, air defence, drones, and command-and-control systems.

A choice Europe can no longer avoid

The Greenland episode served as a brutal wake-up call. Europe now faces a stark choice: remain strategically dependent on a partner that increasingly views it with disdain, or assume responsibility for its own security and destiny.

The mountain air of Davos brought clarity. America is no longer the guarantor Europe once believed it to be — and may even become a source of risk. Political agency, not fatalism, is now Europe’s only viable path forward.

What to note for Prelims?

  • Greenland is an autonomous territory of Denmark.
  • NATO’s Article 5 provides for collective self-defence.
  • EU anti-coercion instrument allows retaliation against economic pressure.
  • European NATO members now largely meet the 2% defence spending target.

What to note for Mains?

  • Impact of US unilateralism on trans-Atlantic security.
  • Limits of NATO in a changing global order.
  • Feasibility of European strategic autonomy.
  • Implications of Arctic geopolitics and great power competition.

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