The failure of the PSLV-C62 mission is not merely a technical setback for the Indian Space Research Organisation. It exposes deeper structural weaknesses in India’s space ecosystem at a time when space has become central to national power, economic competitiveness, and modern warfare. For a country that is now the world’s fourth-largest economy, the gap between ambition and capability in space is becoming strategically consequential.
Why PSLV-C62 matters beyond one launch
PSLV-C62 marks the fifth significant failure for “” in the last seven years. While launch failures are not uncommon even among advanced spacefaring nations, their clustering in India’s case raises questions about reliability, production cycles, and institutional focus. Space today is no longer just about launches; it underpins communications, navigation, intelligence, surveillance, precision warfare, and economic value chains.
India’s slipping position in the global space economy
Globally, space capability is assessed across three linked segments:
- Upstream: satellite constellations and launch systems
- Midstream: rapid data processing and aggregation
- Downstream: commercial applications and revenue generation
India is losing ground in all three. A striking indicator is the collapse of India’s global small-satellite launch market share — from about 35% in 2017 to virtually zero by 2024 — as policy and resources were redirected towards prestige programmes such as Gaganyaan.
Navigation sovereignty and the NavIC problem
India’s push for an indigenous navigation system was triggered during the Kargil conflict when the US restricted GPS accuracy. This led to the creation of NavIC. Yet, progress has stalled. Despite the successful GSLV-F15 launch in January 2025, an orbital anomaly in the NVS-02 satellite has left India with only four fully functional NavIC satellites, two of which are nearing end-of-life. Against a minimum requirement of seven, this erodes both civilian reliability and military credibility.
Commercial bottlenecks and lost orbital real estate
Three structural constraints are now choking India’s commercial space ambitions:
- Slowing launch frequency due to reliability concerns and limited launch infrastructure
- Delays in satellite manufacturing pipelines
- Late filings at the “”, risking loss of spectrum and orbital slots
By contrast, American and Chinese firms have secured vast orbital resources through aggressive ITU filings, shaping future dominance before satellites are even built.
China’s accelerating regional space influence
China’s reforms — where its space programme is closely aligned with the military — have enabled rapid regional expansion. In 2025 alone, China launched multiple satellites for Pakistan, while a Chinese firm signed a major satellite deal that drastically undercut Pakistan’s own space agency. Nepal, too, has turned to China after losing a satellite aboard PSLV-C62. This trend directly undermines India’s regional strategic space footprint.
Data sovereignty and strategic dependence
Strategic autonomy cannot exist without data sovereignty. India’s reliance on foreign navigation, communication, and imaging platforms persists despite capable domestic alternatives. While MapmyIndia’s Mappls is better adapted to Indian conditions, Google Maps continues to dominate usage, exporting data and revenue abroad. China’s approach is instructive: its Beidou GNSS is mandatory, and foreign platforms are restricted.
Military lessons from Operation Sindoor
Operation Sindoor exposed India’s heavy dependence on foreign remote-sensing constellations, with imagery often delayed or selectively shared. In contrast, China reportedly provided Pakistan with extensive civilian satellite imagery in early 2025. India’s experimental electronic intelligence satellite has not matured into operational ELINT constellations, unlike China’s extensive ELINT arrays that reportedly enhanced Pakistan Air Force situational awareness.
Institutional gaps in India’s military space architecture
Unlike the US, Russia, and China — all of which maintain dedicated military space forces — India’s “”, established in 2019, remains underpowered and staffed largely by non-specialists. Fragmented data silos across services prevent the creation of a real-time common operating picture, a cornerstone of multi-domain warfare. Notably, even Pakistan now operates a dedicated space command integrated with its cyber forces.
The widening China–India space asymmetry
While a numerical imbalance with China was inevitable given defence budget differences, the current gap is far wider than strategic logic would suggest. China operated nearly 400 remote-sensing satellites in 2024, while India’s ambitious Space-Based Surveillance-III plan of 52 satellites by 2030 already appears unattainable at present launch rates.
What to note for Prelims?
- PSLV-C62 is the fifth major ISRO failure since 2018
- NavIC requires a minimum of seven operational satellites
- Defence Space Agency established in 2019
- ITU filings determine access to spectrum and orbital slots
What to note for Mains?
- Analyse how space capabilities act as force multipliers in multi-domain warfare
- Examine the implications of India’s dependence on foreign satellite data
- Discuss institutional reforms needed for military space integration in India
- Evaluate the strategic consequences of China’s expanding space footprint in South Asia
Atmanirbharta in space is no longer aspirational; it is foundational. Without urgent policy clarity, accountability, and accelerated capacity-building, India risks entering the next conflict — possibly a “Sindoor 2.0” — with decisive disadvantages far beyond the battlefield.
