Maoism in India has entered a phase of sharp contraction. Once spread across large swathes of central and eastern India, Left Wing Extremism (LWE) has now been confined to a few pockets in the Bastar division of Chhattisgarh. Government data indicate that Maoist-related violence has fallen by nearly 90% between 2010 and 2025, marking one of the most significant internal security turnarounds in recent decades.
The shrinking map of Left Wing Extremism
The contraction of Maoist influence is evident in the steady reduction of affected districts. From 126 districts in 2018, the number fell to 70 in 2021, 38 in 2024, 18 by April 2025, and just 11 by October 2025. Among these, only three districts — Bijapur, Narayanpur and Sukma in south Bastar — remain categorised as the most affected. This geographical concentration underscores how Maoism has lost its earlier spread and mass character.
Why Dandakaranya became the Maoist stronghold
The Maoists entered the Dandakaranya region in the early 1980s after facing sustained pressure in Andhra Pradesh. The region’s dense forests, rugged terrain and location at the tri-junction of multiple States made it a natural rear area. More importantly, governance deficits played a decisive role. Administrative neglect, marginalisation of tribal communities, restricted access to markets and services, and the state’s focus on an extractive economic model created fertile ground for Maoist mobilisation around the issue of ‘jal-jungle-zameen’.
Governance deficit as the core driver of insurgency
In the early decades, the Maoists were able to establish parallel authority structures because the state’s presence was minimal. For many tribal communities, Maoist institutions appeared to fill a vacuum left by absent civil administration. This legitimacy — however coercive — allowed the insurgency to sustain itself despite periodic security operations.
Security camps as the turning point
The decisive shift against Maoism has come from the state’s physical and institutional penetration into remote areas. The establishment of security camps deep inside former Maoist strongholds proved to be a game-changer. Although initial resistance existed, local opposition gradually declined as communities began to experience tangible benefits.
These camps strengthened the security footprint, improved police-to-population ratios and drastically reduced response times to Maoist attacks. They also had a strong psychological impact, signalling the return of state authority and weakening the Maoists’ aura of control.
From security dominance to development access
The impact of the camps went beyond counter-insurgency. Improved security enabled the construction of roads, installation of mobile towers and restoration of basic connectivity. Crucially, civil administration began to piggyback on the security presence. For the first time, officials such as collectors, tehsildars and patwaris regularly reached villages that had long remained outside the governance net.
This convergence of security and development improved human intelligence flows, reduced Maoist recruitment, disrupted logistics and funding networks, and encouraged surrenders. Many cadres and senior leaders have either laid down arms or been neutralised, sharply diminishing Maoist operational capacity.
The waning appeal of Maoist ideology
As state presence expanded and welfare delivery improved, the ideological appeal of Maoism declined. The local population increasingly viewed the government — rather than insurgents — as the primary source of development and protection. This erosion of legitimacy has been as damaging to Maoism as battlefield losses.
The next challenge: rights, not just security
While Maoism’s physical presence is receding, the long-term challenge lies in addressing structural grievances. As tribal communities emerge from isolation, rights-based issues related to land, forests and self-governance will gain prominence. Notably, some surrendered Maoist leaders now seek to pursue tribal causes through democratic means, testing the state’s capacity for inclusive political engagement.
Implementing constitutional guarantees
Sustainable peace will depend on faithful implementation of constitutional and legal safeguards, especially the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act and the Forest Rights Act. In many areas, civil administration is starting almost from scratch, requiring capacity-building, transparency and trust-building.
A long-term, region-specific development roadmap — aligned with the Viksit Bharat vision and extending up to 2047 — could help consolidate gains and prevent relapse. The security forces have created the enabling conditions through sustained sacrifice and operational success. The responsibility now shifts decisively to governance institutions to convert security gains into durable peace.
What to note for Prelims?
- Sharp reduction in LWE-affected districts between 2018 and 2025.
- Bastar division as the last major Maoist pocket.
- Role of security camps in counter-insurgency strategy.
- PESA and Forest Rights Act as key legal frameworks.
What to note for Mains?
- Governance deficit as the root cause of Maoism in India.
- Security–development convergence in counter-insurgency success.
- Limits of force-based approaches without rights-based governance.
- Post-insurgency challenges of political inclusion and tribal empowerment.
