Israel’s decision in December 2025 to recognise Somaliland as an independent sovereign state has altered the diplomatic landscape of the Horn of Africa. While immediate reactions have focused on Somalia’s sovereignty and Israel’s maritime interests, the move has placed China in an especially difficult strategic position — one that exposes the tensions between its rigid sovereignty doctrine and its expanding geopolitical ambitions.
Why Israel’s move is more than symbolic
Somaliland, a self-governing entity since 1991, has long functioned as a de facto state but lacked international recognition. Israel’s decision represents a diplomatic rupture in a region already marked by fragility. It risks intensifying proxy rivalries, inviting coercive diplomacy, and accelerating the militarisation of the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor, one of the world’s most sensitive maritime zones.
For China, this is not a peripheral issue. Somaliland’s status intersects directly with Beijing’s core interests in territorial integrity, maritime security, and great-power competition in Africa.
The “One China” principle meets a hard case
China has predictably condemned Israel’s recognition, reiterating that Somaliland is an “inseparable part” of Somalia. This position is consistent with Beijing’s defence of absolute sovereignty, shaped largely by its concerns over Taiwan.
Yet Somaliland presents an uncomfortable exception. Unlike many separatist territories, it has enjoyed relative peace, built functioning institutions, and conducted competitive elections for over three decades. Its contrast with Somalia’s prolonged instability exposes the limits of China’s argument that internal legitimacy is irrelevant to statehood.
The Taiwan factor deepens Beijing’s anxiety
China’s dilemma sharpened in 2020 when Somaliland established official ties with Taiwan, directly challenging the “One China” principle. Taipei’s representative office in Hargeisa and expanding cooperation in health, technology, and education have made Somaliland an outlier on the continent. In Africa, only Eswatini maintains formal relations with Taiwan.
Israel’s recognition now risks amplifying this challenge by legitimising a territory that openly engages with Taipei.
The Red Sea and China’s maritime stakes
Beyond ideology, geography is decisive. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait — linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden — is a critical choke point for China’s trade and energy flows under the Maritime Silk Road. Beijing has repeatedly described it as a “jugular vein” of global commerce.
China’s first overseas military base, established in Djibouti in 2017, underscores the importance it attaches to securing this corridor. Any shift in regional alignments that creates alternative security or logistics hubs near the Gulf of Aden threatens China’s carefully managed influence.
A potential rival security ecosystem
If Somaliland gains wider recognition — backed by Israel, the UAE, and potentially the United States — it could emerge as a new intelligence, port, and security hub. For Beijing, the prospect of a rival ecosystem developing close to Djibouti is deeply unsettling.
China has invested heavily in ports, infrastructure, and political relationships across the Horn of Africa. A legitimised Somaliland could dilute this leverage and complicate China’s ability to dominate regional security arrangements.
Between coercion and credibility: China’s strategic bind
Beijing faces a difficult trade-off. It must oppose Somaliland’s recognition to defend the “One China” principle and block Taiwan’s diplomatic space. Yet overt coercion risks pushing Hargeisa further toward China’s rivals — Israel, Taiwan, and western powers seeking alternatives to Djibouti.
Heavy-handed tactics would also undermine China’s cultivated image as a non-interfering partner. As a result, Beijing may rely on subtler tools: economic pressure, elite lobbying, and information campaigns. Chinese media networks such as StarTimes, operating across Africa, already provide platforms to frame narratives around territorial integrity and external interference.
Diplomatically, China can also use its veto power at the United Nations Security Council to block momentum toward broader international recognition.
Middle East politics add another layer
China’s increasingly vocal pro-Palestinian stance further complicates matters. By criticising Israel’s actions in Gaza and positioning itself as a defender of Palestinian rights, Beijing reinforces its moral opposition to Israel’s Somaliland move. While this plays well with Arab and Global South audiences, it risks entangling China more deeply in Middle Eastern politics — an arena where it has traditionally preferred pragmatic neutrality.
A shifting regional calculus
The broader context heightens the stakes. Ethiopia’s 2024 memorandum of understanding offering port access in exchange for recognising Somaliland, growing interest in the U.S. Congress, and tacit support from the UAE all suggest that Israel’s move could trigger a cascade of recognitions.
Each additional endorsement would weaken China’s ability to isolate Somaliland diplomatically and raise the strategic costs of defending the status quo.
What to note for Prelims?
- Status of Somaliland and reasons for non-recognition
- Bab el-Mandeb Strait as a strategic choke point
- China’s “One China” principle and African diplomacy
- Location and significance of China’s Djibouti base
What to note for Mains?
- Limits of sovereignty-based diplomacy in de facto states
- China’s strategic dilemmas in the Horn of Africa
- Intersection of Taiwan issue with African geopolitics
- Impact of great-power competition on Red Sea security
