The Supreme Court of India has recently made a clear statement to the Indian government concerning the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI): ongoing interim appointments for the CBI Director’s seat should not persist. The Court’s decree follows a petition lodged against the continual appointment of interim CBI Directors, which is usually triggered by the retirement of the preceding regular CBI Director.
The Petitioner’s Propositions
The petitioner’s complaint was centered on the government’s perceived inability to select a standard Director via the high-power selection committee, consisting of the Prime Minister, Chief Justice of India, and Leader of Opposition. According to the petitioner, the 1946 Act (Delhi Special Police Establishment Act of 1946) did not consider an interim appointment using an executive order.
They also urged the Court to expedite the initiation of a mechanism that will see the selection process for a new CBI Director commence one or two months prior to the incumbent’s retirement. The petitioner cited Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India (2019), a case relating to vacancies at the Central Information Commission and State Information Commissions.
Overview of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
In 1963, the Ministry of Home Affairs instituted the CBI through a resolution. Presently, the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) under the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions administers the CBI. The formation of the CBI was recommended by the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption (1962–1964).
Nevertheless, the CBI is not a statutory body and its powers are bestowed by the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. It serves as the primary investigating agency for the Central Government, while also supporting the Central Vigilance Commission and Lokpal. Furthermore, it functions as the primary police agency in India that liaises investigations on behalf of Interpol Member countries.
Challenges Hampering CBI’s Functionality
Several elements pose challenges to the CBI’s functionality. Legal ambiguity resulting from the lack of clearly outlined spheres of functionality and overlapped areas of influence undermines the institution’s integrity and effectiveness.
Under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946, consent from the state is essential for investigating offences committed within its territory. Also, a 2020 report by a Parliamentary panel noted a massive shortage of officers which could potentially affect the quality of investigations and augment pendencies. The panel also reported hundreds of vacancies in executive ranks, law offices, and technical staff positions.
Furthermore, a lack of sufficient investment in personnel, research, training, equipment, and other support structures severely impedes professional performance of duties. Over the past few decades, significant strides have been made in instilling transparency and accountability in public life and institutions, but ensuring internal accountability is equally important to maintain morale within the force.
However, due to the executive having substantial control over the agency under Section 4 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946, there is always the possibility of the CBI being used as a political instrument.
Way Forward
There’s an imperative need to ensure that the CBI operates under a formal, robust legal framework built for a modern-day investigative agency. Implementation of a new CBI Act is necessary to guarantee the autonomy of the CBI, while simultaneously improving supervision quality. The new Act should explicitly declare government interference as a criminal liability to protect the CBI from political interference administratively.
