A recent US court ruling in favour of Meta has reignited a central debate in competition law: whether antitrust enforcement can succeed if it intervenes too late. The judgment, which rejected claims that Meta holds an illegal monopoly in social media, highlights a deeper structural problem in how regulators approach fast-evolving digital markets — one where delayed action can render even the strongest evidence ineffective.
What was the Meta antitrust case about?
The case focused on Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014, transactions that US regulators now argue eliminated serious competitive threats. Internal company documents revealed that Facebook’s leadership clearly viewed Instagram as an existential rival and pursued a strategy of “copy, acquire, or neutralise” competitors.
Such direct evidence of anti-competitive intent is rare in antitrust litigation. Yet, despite this, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) failed to convince the court that Meta currently exercises monopoly power in social media.
Why did the court rule against the FTC?
The court rejected the FTC’s narrow definition of the relevant market, instead holding that Meta competes with a wide range of platforms such as TikTok, YouTube, and Snapchat. On this basis, it concluded that Meta does not enjoy monopoly power today.
The ruling relied heavily on present-day market conditions rather than the competitive landscape at the time the acquisitions occurred. The rise of TikTok, in particular, was cited as evidence of robust competition — even though TikTok’s success was enabled by massive capital backing and heavy advertising on Meta’s own platforms.
What is the core flaw in late antitrust enforcement?
The Meta decision exposes a fundamental weakness in challenging completed mergers. Courts are asked to assess hypothetical scenarios: what competition might have existed had the merger not occurred, or how a firm would have evolved independently. Such counterfactuals are inherently difficult to prove.
In contrast, intervening at the merger-review stage requires predicting future harm — a challenging task, but arguably less speculative than reconstructing an alternative past after market structures have already been reshaped.
How does this pattern appear in other tech cases?
Similar dynamics were visible in the Google antitrust case, where a court found Google guilty of monopolising general search, but remedies were softened due to the emergence of AI-driven alternatives. Instead of restoring competition in search, the focus shifted to keeping future markets open.
The Microsoft case of the 1990s followed a comparable trajectory. Rather than dismantling Microsoft’s dominance in operating systems, the litigation prevented it from extending that power into browsers and applications — enabling future competition but accepting existing monopolies as irreversible.
Why is prevention more effective than cure in digital markets?
Digital markets are characterised by network effects, scale economies, and data advantages that allow early winners to entrench dominance quickly. Once competitors are absorbed or eliminated, restoring competition becomes extremely difficult.
Blocking anti-competitive mergers early is therefore crucial. Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp — both direct competitors in a growing market — represented classic antitrust harm. Allowing them on the assumption that markets would self-correct proved to be a costly misjudgment.
What has changed in antitrust thinking?
In recent years, US regulators under the Biden administration began shifting toward a preventive approach. They challenged high-profile mergers, scrutinised AI partnerships, and launched early probes into emerging monopolies in cloud computing and semiconductors.
However, this momentum has slowed under the current political climate, with greater tolerance for merger settlements and a renewed belief that large tech firms are essential for innovation and national security.
What role do global regulators play?
Major tech mergers are reviewed across multiple jurisdictions. Authorities in the European Union and the UK possess strong preventive tools such as merger reviews and market investigations. In some cases, merely initiating scrutiny has been enough to derail global deals.
Yet, competition enforcement is retreating globally due to geopolitical pressures and competition to attract AI investment. This risks repeating the mistakes of the platform era, just as AI markets begin to take shape.
Why is political will crucial?
Regulators today have better analytical frameworks and stronger merger guidelines. What they lack is consistent political backing to act early and decisively. Antitrust enforcement in global markets faces a collective-action problem — but even a single assertive authority can alter the trajectory of an entire industry.
The Meta ruling is not just about one failed case. It underscores a broader lesson: in fast-moving technology markets, delayed enforcement often amounts to no enforcement at all.
What to note for Prelims?
- Concept of monopoly power and market definition
- Role of the US FTC and DOJ in antitrust enforcement
- Difference between merger review and post-merger litigation
- Network effects in digital markets
What to note for Mains?
- Preventive versus reactive antitrust enforcement
- Challenges of regulating digital and AI-driven markets
- Role of political economy in competition regulation
- Lessons from global tech antitrust cases for India’s competition policy
