As 2025 closes, a striking feature of U.S. foreign policy is the largest American troop mobilisation in the Caribbean in decades. The deployment of an advanced aircraft carrier, submarines, amphibious vessels and tens of thousands of troops signals a renewed determination to reassert dominance in the Western Hemisphere, even as Washington visibly steps back from its traditional role as Europe’s primary security guarantor. Together, these moves reveal how the United States is adjusting to a changing global balance of power.
A muscular return to the Western Hemisphere
The immediate trigger for the mobilisation is rising pressure on “” and its President “”. But the broader rationale is strategic. The National Security Strategy released in December 2025 under “” explicitly elevates Latin America and the Caribbean as priority theatres. Reviving the logic of the “”, Washington asserts that no external power should exercise decisive influence in the region — an unmistakable reference to China’s expanding economic and political footprint.
Why Europe is no longer central
This hemispheric focus coincides with a clear downgrading of Europe in American strategic thinking. Since the Second World War, the U.S. has been Europe’s chief security provider, first during the Cold War and later through the eastward expansion of “” after the Soviet Union’s collapse. Under the Trump administration, however, this commitment is explicitly questioned. The new strategy argues that Europe must shoulder greater responsibility for its own defence, reflecting Washington’s reluctance to bear the costs of maintaining a vast alliance network.
The end of the unipolar moment
Behind this recalibration lies a deeper structural shift. After 1991, the U.S. stood unrivalled at the centre of a unipolar order. That phase has ended. A key rupture came with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, which exposed the limits of the so-called rules-based order. While the U.S. remains the world’s most powerful military and economic actor, it is no longer the only great power shaping outcomes. “” and “” now share that space, reinforcing a more anarchic international system.
China as the principal challenger
For Washington, China represents a fundamentally different challenge from the Soviet Union. Its economy is already over two-thirds the size of the U.S. economy and continues to grow faster. This economic weight is being converted into military capability, most visibly in the expansion of the world’s largest navy by ship numbers. Like past rising powers, Beijing seeks regional hegemony and greater global influence, setting the stage for a prolonged contest between a reigning and a rising power — a dynamic reminiscent of late 19th century Europe.
Russia’s role as a disruptive power
Russia is the weakest of the three great powers in economic terms, but it compensates through nuclear weapons, energy resources and a demonstrated willingness to use force. Since the 2008 war in Georgia, Moscow has aimed to revise the post-Soviet security architecture in Europe. Western sanctions and support for Ukraine have pushed Russia closer to China, yet Moscow remains wary of becoming a junior partner. This ambiguity leaves open, at least in theory, the possibility of a limited U.S.–Russia reset, though the Ukraine war remains a major obstacle.
From bipolarity to fluid multipolarity
Today’s world is already multipolar, but unlike earlier transitions, its structures are unsettled. China lacks formal satellite blocs, the U.S. is reassessing its alliances, and Russia seeks recognition of its sphere of influence. The result is a fluid order rather than a stable system. Middle powers — from U.S. allies like Japan and Germany to autonomous actors such as India and Brazil — are hedging their bets rather than aligning rigidly with any camp.
Offshore balancing and American strategy
The Trump administration’s approach fits the logic of offshore balancing: reduce commitments in distant theatres like Europe, consolidate dominance closer to home, and focus long-term resources on managing China’s rise. Whether or not this strategy succeeds, it reflects constraints future American leaders are unlikely to ignore. By reinforcing primacy in the Western Hemisphere while loosening ties elsewhere, Washington is acknowledging that it must prioritise in a world where power is no longer concentrated in one capital.
What to note for Prelims?
- Revival of the Monroe Doctrine in contemporary U.S. strategy.
- Shift from unipolarity to multipolarity in global politics.
- Concept of offshore balancing in international relations.
- China identified as the principal systemic challenger to the U.S.
What to note for Mains?
- Analyse reasons behind U.S. strategic retrenchment from Europe.
- Discuss the implications of renewed U.S. focus on Latin America.
- Examine China–Russia convergence and its limits.
- Evaluate how fluid multipolarity reshapes choices for middle powers like India.
