Current Affairs

General Studies Prelims

General Studies (Mains)

China’s Ageing Trap

China’s Ageing Trap

China is facing a demographic turning point that could fundamentally reshape its economy, society and global standing. After decades of population expansion, the country’s population has been declining continuously since 2022. United Nations projections suggest that by 2050 China’s population will shrink to around 1.3 billion from a peak of about 1.4 billion, with nearly 40% of its people above the age of 60. The long-feared scenario of China “getting old before it gets rich” is no longer theoretical—it is unfolding in real time.

How China reached this demographic crossroads

For decades, China’s demographic trajectory was shaped by strict population control. The one-child policy, introduced in the late 1970s, succeeded in curbing population growth but also sowed the seeds of today’s ageing crisis. As fertility rates collapsed and life expectancy rose, the proportion of elderly citizens steadily increased while the working-age population began to shrink.

Recognising the long-term risks, Chinese President Xi Jinping dismantled the one-child policy in 2016 and replaced it with a two-child policy. In 2021, this was further expanded to a three-child policy. Yet, despite this dramatic policy reversal, birth rates have continued to fall, indicating that demographic behaviour has become largely disconnected from state directives.

Recent policy measures to boost births and manage ageing

In response to the deepening demographic challenge, the Chinese government has rolled out a wide array of interventions, blending financial incentives, administrative reforms and social campaigns.

One of the most recent measures, implemented from January 1, 2026, imposes a 13% value-added tax on contraceptives and condoms, signalling a shift from population control to population promotion. Earlier, in 2025, the government announced a subsidy of 3,600 yuan per year for new parents for the first three years of a child’s life. Education-related costs have also been targeted, with fee waivers for the final year of kindergarten and reductions in private kindergarten fees. To stabilise early-childhood education, kindergarten teachers’ salaries have been brought under fiscal guarantees to ensure timely payment.

Labour force pressures and pension anxieties

Demographic decline is already tightening China’s labour market. To manage workforce shortages and delay pension stress, Beijing raised the retirement age last year. Men now retire at 63 instead of 60, while women retire at 58 in white-collar jobs and 55 in blue-collar jobs, both higher than earlier thresholds.

The urgency behind this move is underlined by warnings from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which has projected that China’s state pension fund could run out of money by 2035 if current trends persist. To keep older citizens economically active for longer, China has also relaxed age limits for certain civil service examinations, raising the general cut-off to 38 years, and even higher for candidates with postgraduate qualifications.

State-led social engineering and private life

Beyond economic incentives, the Chinese state has intensified its involvement in citizens’ personal lives. Government-backed campaigns urge young people to marry earlier, have children and contribute to building a “birth-friendly society”. In some instances, local officials have reportedly contacted married women to inquire about menstrual cycles and pregnancy plans, reflecting an intrusive governance approach.

Efforts are also underway to curb the traditional “bride price”, which can make marriage financially burdensome for men. Universities are being encouraged to introduce “love courses” for single students, aimed at promoting relationships and eventual marriage.

Ideology, gender and the burden on women

For President Xi, reversing demographic decline is closely tied to the idea of “national rejuvenation”. At the 20th Party Congress, he emphasised improving population development strategies and reducing the costs associated with childbirth, childcare and education. In earlier remarks, he also articulated a vision of women as “good wives and good mothers”, urging them to align their personal futures with that of the nation.

This framing has drawn criticism for placing disproportionate responsibility on women to resolve a structural demographic crisis. It also risks reinforcing traditional gender roles at a time when women’s educational attainment, career aspirations and economic participation have expanded significantly.

Why pro-natalist policies are struggling

Despite an extensive policy toolkit, China’s efforts to raise birth rates have delivered limited results. The legacy of the one-child policy has reshaped social norms, making small families the default aspiration. Urban living costs, expensive healthcare, high education fees and job insecurity further discourage young couples from having children. Rising unemployment among the youth has added to this sense of uncertainty.

Compounding the problem is China’s skewed sex ratio. Preference for male children during the one-child era has left the country with roughly 30 million more men than women, distorting marriage markets and further suppressing fertility.

Broader implications for China and the world

An ageing and shrinking population will have profound consequences for China’s economic growth, fiscal stability and geopolitical ambitions. Slower labour force growth could weaken productivity, while higher elderly dependency will strain social security systems. For the global economy, China’s demographic slowdown may alter supply chains, consumption patterns and international capital flows.

What to note for Prelims

  • China’s population has been declining since 2022; nearly 40% may be over 60 by 2050.
  • Shift from one-child to two-child (2016) and three-child (2021) policies.
  • Recent measures include childcare subsidies, retirement age hike and incentives for marriage.

What to note for Mains

  • Link between demographic ageing and economic growth in China.
  • Limits of state-led pro-natalist policies in changing social behaviour.
  • Gender dimensions of population policy and burden on women.
  • Implications of ageing China for global economy and geopolitics.

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