India’s climate record is again under scrutiny, triggered partly by the recent Aravalli judgment on mining and environmental regulation, and partly by a broader reassessment of the country’s international climate commitments. More than a decade after the Paris climate summit, the central question is no longer what India promised, but whether those promises have translated into genuine ecological outcomes rather than statistical achievements.
What India committed to at Paris
At the Paris climate summit, India anchored its pledges in the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” arguing that its historical and per capita emissions remained far below those of advanced economies, even though it is now the world’s third-largest emitter in absolute terms. The commitments were fourfold: a 33–35% reduction in emissions intensity of GDP from 2005 levels by 2030, raising non-fossil fuel electricity capacity to 40% by 2030 (later enhanced to 50%), achieving 175 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2022, and creating an additional forest carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent.
These targets were designed to balance development needs with climate responsibility. Over time, India has largely met the numerical benchmarks, but questions remain about their real-world environmental impact.
Emissions intensity: early gains, partial decoupling
India’s most visible climate success lies in emissions intensity reduction. By 2020, emissions intensity had fallen by about 36% from 2005 levels, effectively meeting the 2030 target a decade early. Three structural factors explain this outcome. First, the expansion of non-fossil electricity reduced the carbon intensity of power generation. Second, the economy shifted towards services and digital sectors, which are less carbon-intensive. Third, national efficiency programmes such as Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) and UJALA reduced energy demand growth in industry and households.
However, this progress reflects incomplete decoupling. Absolute emissions have not declined. India’s greenhouse gas emissions stood at roughly 2,959 MtCO₂e in 2020 and have remained high thereafter. Economic growth has outpaced emissions growth, lowering intensity but not total emissions. This distinction is crucial, as intensity averages conceal sectoral divergence. Emissions from cement, steel, and transport continue to rise, even as power-sector emissions growth has moderated. Without absolute emissions moderation, intensity-based success has limited climate value.
Renewable capacity versus actual electricity generation
India’s renewable energy expansion is impressive in scale but limited in effect. Non-fossil capacity rose from about 29.5% in 2015 to over 51% by mid-2025, with solar power driving most of the growth. Wind power expanded more slowly due to land constraints, grid connectivity delays, and regulatory uncertainty.
Despite crossing the non-fossil capacity threshold, renewables accounted for only about 22% of electricity generation in 2024–25. Coal remains dominant, supplying more than 70% of power because it provides continuous baseload electricity. The missed 175 GW renewable target for 2022 illustrates the gap between capacity addition and system-wide transformation. A 500 GW target by 2030 may be achievable in capacity terms, but its climate impact depends on integration, reliability, and displacement of coal generation.
Storage deficit and grid constraints
Energy storage is the most critical bottleneck in India’s energy transition. The Central Electricity Authority estimates a requirement of 336 GWh of storage capacity by 2029–30, yet operational storage remains negligible. Without large-scale batteries or pumped storage, renewable electricity cannot reliably replace coal.
Government programmes have succeeded in adding around 25 GW of renewable capacity annually, but execution challenges persist. Delays in transmission infrastructure, land acquisition hurdles, and uneven state-level implementation prevent renewables from reshaping the generation mix. As a result, coal-based capacity—over 250 GW—continues to anchor the power system.
Forest carbon sinks: accounting versus ecology
India appears close to meeting its forest carbon sink target. Official estimates suggest that total forest carbon stock has increased by over 2.2 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent since 2005. However, this achievement depends heavily on how “forest cover” is defined. The inclusion of plantations, orchards, and sparsely canopied land blurs the line between ecological forests and administrative categories.
Satellite data show only marginal increases in actual forest area, raising concerns about the ecological quality of sequestration. Compensatory afforestation funds remain underutilised in several states, and plantation-driven approaches often prioritise carbon numbers over biodiversity, resilience, and long-term sustainability. Climate stress, including warming and water scarcity, further weakens the durability of such carbon sinks.
Why the Aravalli debate is significant
The renewed focus on the Aravallis highlights the disconnect between climate commitments and environmental governance. Dilution of protections in ecologically sensitive zones undermines both biodiversity and long-term climate resilience. Climate action cannot be separated from land-use regulation, forest conservation, and environmental enforcement if emissions reductions are to be meaningful.
The road ahead: beyond headline metrics
India’s climate performance is best described as uneven. It has largely delivered on quantified commitments, particularly emissions intensity reduction and non-fossil capacity expansion. Yet these gains coexist with rising absolute emissions, continued coal dependence, inadequate storage, and ecologically weak forest strategies.
The next phase of climate action must focus on outcomes rather than installations—converting capacity into sustained clean generation, translating intensity reductions into absolute emissions moderation, and strengthening environmental governance. The coming five years will be decisive in determining whether India’s climate trajectory moves from performative compliance to structural transformation.
What to note for Prelims?
- India has already met its emissions intensity reduction target well ahead of 2030.
- Non-fossil capacity exceeds 50%, but coal still dominates electricity generation.
- Energy storage is the key constraint in renewable integration.
- Forest carbon sink targets rely on broad definitions of forest cover.
What to note for Mains?
- Distinguish between emissions intensity reduction and absolute emissions reduction.
- Analyse why renewable capacity growth has not translated into proportional electricity generation.
- Critically examine plantation-based forest sequestration strategies.
- Link environmental governance issues, such as the Aravalli case, with India’s climate credibility.
