As Prime Minister, Mark Carney has begun articulating a distinctive vision for Canada’s place in a rapidly fragmenting world order. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 20, he outlined what he called a “third path” — a framework for countries caught between intensifying U.S.–China rivalry. The idea, rooted in “values-based realism”, seeks neither subordination to a hegemon nor isolation, but coordinated action among middle powers. For countries like India, the argument resonates deeply.
A ‘third path’ in an age of rivalry
Carney’s core proposition is stark: in a world defined by great-power rivalry, countries that lie between the major poles have a choice. They can either compete with one another for favour from dominant powers, or combine to create an alternative pathway with collective impact. This approach explicitly seeks to steer clear of binary alignment with either the United States or China.
Unlike many Western leaders, Carney openly acknowledges the limits and contradictions of the liberal international order. He rejects the notion that current turbulence can be dismissed as a temporary aberration caused by a single leader such as Donald Trump. Instead, he characterises it as a rupture — a structural break with no easy return to an earlier order.
Questioning the liberal international order
Carney’s introspection is unusual among Western liberals, who often frame today’s global churn as a moral contest between democracy and authoritarianism. While himself a liberal on social and economic issues, Carney argues that the old order was sustained by illusions — particularly about fairness, stability, and shared rules.
By describing the past system as one that involved “living a lie”, he implicitly recognises why many countries in the Global South have remained sceptical of Western-led institutions. This realism underpins his argument that new frameworks are needed — not nostalgia for an order that no longer commands legitimacy or effectiveness.
Canada’s recalibration, including China
The speech came soon after Carney’s visit to China, where he announced a strategic partnership, marking a thaw after years of strained relations. He emphasised that Canada’s engagement with Beijing would be “calibrated”, not naïve, but also not frozen by ideological rigidity.
At the same time, Carney reaffirmed Canada’s positions on sensitive issues, including Arctic sovereignty. He explicitly stated support for Greenland and Denmark, underlining that values and interests would continue to shape Canada’s choices.
Why this matters for India
Carney’s framework has particular relevance for India. For decades, sections of India’s policy community have argued that New Delhi lost out by not fully integrating into the U.S.-led order. India, however, deliberately avoided deep subordination, even while improving ties with the West. Recent global developments — financial sanctions, weaponisation of supply chains, and dependence-driven vulnerabilities — have reinforced the logic of that caution.
Carney’s articulation effectively validates India’s long-standing emphasis on strategic autonomy, now reinterpreted not as aloofness but as a basis for coalition-building among middle powers.
Strategic autonomy without isolation
A key insight of what might be called a “Carney Doctrine” is that strategic autonomy need not mean isolationism. Carney argues that the real choice for middle powers is not whether to adapt to the new reality — adaptation is unavoidable — but how to adapt.
Rather than “building higher walls”, he calls for more ambitious cooperation among middle powers. Such cooperation, he suggests, can rebalance negotiations with hegemons and reduce vulnerability to pressure.
Middle powers acting together
Carney explicitly situates India within this emerging network. He noted that Canada has recently concluded strategic partnerships with China and Qatar, and is negotiating free trade agreements with India, ASEAN, Thailand, the Philippines, and Mercosur.
His logic is that middle powers share structural vulnerabilities that are routinely leveraged by larger states. When negotiating individually with a hegemon, they bargain from weakness and compete with one another to be the most accommodating. This, Carney argues, is not genuine sovereignty but its performance — autonomy in form, subordination in substance.
Contradictions and lived experience
Critics point to tensions between Carney’s rhetoric and Canada’s actions, especially in balancing ties with China while remaining embedded in Western alliances. Carney appears unfazed by this critique. Indeed, he suggests that such contradictions are themselves symptoms of diminished autonomy in a hegemon-dominated system.
His warning is blunt: if middle powers are not collectively present at the table where rules are shaped, they risk ending up “on the menu”.
India’s unspoken experience
India, too, has experienced the costs of asymmetric dependence — in trade, technology access, and strategic space. While New Delhi may not articulate its position in Carney’s language, the underlying experience is familiar. The challenge ahead is whether India can translate its strategic autonomy into active coalition-building with other middle powers, rather than navigating great-power rivalry alone.
What to note for Prelims?
- Concept of “values-based realism” in foreign policy.
- Middle powers as distinct actors in global politics.
- Canada’s recalibration of ties with China.
- Role of groupings like ASEAN and Mercosur.
What to note for Mains?
- Limits of the liberal international order in a multipolar world.
- Strategic autonomy versus alignment in Indian foreign policy.
- Scope for middle-power coalitions in global governance.
- Risks of bilateralism with hegemons in trade and security.
