Five years after the February 1, 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s armed forces attempted to project a return to political normalcy through elections conducted between December 2025 and January 2026. The outcome—a sweeping victory for the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)—was never in doubt. Limited voting, the exclusion of major opposition parties, and an ongoing civil war ensured that the exercise functioned less as a democratic transition and more as an instrument of regime consolidation.
Why the Election Outcome Was Preordained
Voting was permitted in only 265 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, largely restricted to urban wards under military control. Vast rural areas remain under the influence of resistance forces, effectively outside the junta’s reach. The regime’s claim of a 55% turnout—around 13.14 million voters—marks a steep fall from the nearly 70% participation recorded in the 2015 and 2020 elections. This decline reflects not apathy, but popular rejection of a tightly scripted political process.
The credibility gap widened when the junta-appointed Union Election Commission dissolved several opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), the Arakan National Party and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing fielded dozens of serving and retired military officers under the USDP banner, virtually guaranteeing the result. A new Parliament is expected to be constituted within two months, but its legitimacy remains deeply contested.
Elections Amid an Expanding Civil War
Since the coup, repression has been relentless. At least 7,738 people—including journalists, activists and civilians—have been killed, and more than 30,000 arrested. Of these, over 22,000 remain in detention, including NLD leader and former president . Entire regions such as Sagaing and Magway have seen large-scale destruction of homes and civilian infrastructure.
This violence has strengthened armed resistance. The People’s Defence Forces, operating alongside long-established ethnic armed organisations, now control or contest large swathes of territory, including at least 91 towns. Far from stabilising the country, the elections risk intensifying conflict by hardening resistance to military rule.
India’s Calibrated Diplomatic Response
For India, Myanmar is a strategic neighbour and a crucial link to Southeast Asia under its Act East Policy. The elections have therefore posed a familiar dilemma: how to protect security and connectivity interests without legitimising a deeply flawed political process.
Official statements by External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal in December 2025 and January 2026 reiterated India’s support for Myanmar’s democratic transition, stressing that any electoral process must be “free, fair and inclusive” and involve all stakeholders. New Delhi also clarified that Indians who visited Myanmar during the elections did so in their personal capacity, signalling deliberate diplomatic distance.
Engagement Without Endorsement
This cautious approach has been accompanied by continued high-level engagement. On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in August 2025, Prime Minister met Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. While reaffirming India’s willingness to support Myanmar’s development, the Prime Minister underlined the need for inclusive elections—an attempt to balance realism with principle.
India has also maintained humanitarian engagement. Following the March 2025 earthquake, New Delhi deployed relief teams and established a temporary field hospital under Operation Brahma. Such initiatives allow India to remain present on the ground without conferring political legitimacy on the junta.
Border Instability and Refugee Pressures
Myanmar shares a 1,643-kilometre border with four northeastern Indian States, making instability across the frontier inseparable from India’s internal security. Violence has already driven large refugee inflows. India currently hosts around 90,100 displaced Myanmar nationals, mainly in Mizoram and Manipur. In the absence of a national refugee policy, State governments have borne the brunt of this humanitarian burden—a pressure likely to persist if post-election instability continues.
Connectivity Projects in Jeopardy
Key Indian-backed connectivity initiatives, including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, have faced repeated delays due to insecurity in conflict zones. The junta’s claims of post-election “normalisation” are unlikely to translate into safer operating conditions, forcing India to reassess timelines, risks and engagement strategies.
Emerging Non-Traditional Security Threats
The breakdown of authority has also fuelled transnational crimes. Narcotics trafficking, human trafficking and cyber scam networks have proliferated along Myanmar’s conflict-affected borders. Of particular concern are cyber scam centres and cyber slavery operations, from which over 2,100 Indians have been rescued since 2022. These developments highlight new, non-traditional security challenges requiring coordinated domestic and regional responses.
What Lies Ahead for New Delhi
As Western countries and regional groupings such as the refrain from recognising the election outcome, India is likely to persist with a middle path. This involves limited engagement with the regime to safeguard core interests, while quietly maintaining contacts with local actors and humanitarian channels.
Myanmar’s elections have not marked a turning point. Instead, they underline a hard reality for India: managing relations with a fractured neighbour will demand a careful balance between democratic principles and strategic pragmatism—at a time when neither offers an easy exit.
What to Note for Prelims?
- Timeline of Myanmar’s 2021 coup and post-coup elections
- Role of USDP and exclusion of NLD
- India–Myanmar border length and strategic importance
- Key connectivity projects linking India and Myanmar
What to Note for Mains?
- India’s dilemma between democratic values and strategic interests in Myanmar
- Impact of instability in Myanmar on India’s Northeast
- Limits of elections as a conflict-resolution tool in civil war settings
- Non-traditional security threats emerging from state collapse
