On February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired, marking the end of the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia. For over three decades, START and its successor agreements symbolised a shift from Cold War excess to negotiated restraint. Its lapse raises serious questions about the future of global nuclear stability, strategic competition, and the credibility of multilateral non-proliferation regimes.
From Nuclear Excess to Negotiated Reduction
The Cold War era witnessed an unprecedented nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. By the 1980s, both possessed over 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads each, alongside vast delivery systems including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers.
Earlier initiatives such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) sought to cap the growth of arsenals but did not mandate actual reductions. A fundamental shift occurred with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed in July 1991. For the first time, the superpowers agreed not merely to limit but to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals.
START I required both sides to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 6,000 and scale down delivery systems proportionally. This marked roughly a 30% reduction from levels permitted under previous frameworks. Subsequent agreements deepened these cuts, culminating in the 2010 New START, which capped deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 each.
Why New START Mattered
New START was significant not only for numerical ceilings but also for its verification and transparency mechanisms. These included:
- On-site inspections
- Data exchanges on deployed forces
- Notification systems regarding movements and changes in nuclear arsenals
Such measures reduced mistrust and miscalculation — critical elements in nuclear deterrence stability. Even during periods of strained U.S.-Russia relations, the treaty provided a structured channel of communication and predictability.
With its expiration, there are no legally binding limits on the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world. This absence increases the risk of competitive expansion and doctrinal hardening.
Changing Geopolitics and the China Factor
The strategic landscape today differs markedly from the bipolar Cold War order. China’s expanding nuclear stockpile and modernisation of delivery systems have altered global calculations. The United States has indicated that future arms control arrangements must include China, arguing that bilateral limits are inadequate in a multipolar nuclear environment.
China, however, maintains a significantly smaller arsenal compared to the U.S. and Russia, and has historically resisted inclusion in trilateral frameworks unless reductions by the two larger powers reach comparable levels.
The emerging reality is a transition from bipolar nuclear management to a more complex multipolar deterrence structure, involving not only China but also other nuclear-armed states.
Implications for the Global Non-Proliferation Architecture
The expiry of New START carries consequences beyond U.S.-Russia relations. It affects the credibility of global non-proliferation regimes such as:
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
- The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The NPT rests on a grand bargain: non-nuclear weapon states forgo nuclear arms in exchange for peaceful nuclear cooperation and a commitment by nuclear weapon states to pursue disarmament. If leading nuclear powers appear unwilling to continue reductions, the normative strength of this bargain weakens.
Moreover, in a world witnessing renewed geopolitical rivalries, territorial disputes, and economic protectionism, the revival of arms-race doctrines becomes more plausible.
Debates Around Equity and Discrimination
Critics argue that existing non-proliferation frameworks are structurally unequal. The NPT recognises five nuclear weapon states based on a historical cut-off date, while others remain permanently outside the recognised nuclear club.
From this perspective, the end of New START could become an opportunity to rethink global arms control on more equitable and inclusive terms — perhaps through broader multilateral frameworks rather than exclusive bilateral arrangements.
However, achieving consensus among diverse strategic cultures and threat perceptions remains a formidable diplomatic challenge.
What Lies Ahead for Arms Control?
The expiration of New START does not automatically trigger an arms race, but it removes institutional guardrails. Future trajectories may include:
- Renewed bilateral negotiations between the U.S. and Russia
- Efforts to incorporate China into structured dialogue
- Issue-specific agreements (e.g., on hypersonic weapons or missile defence)
- Informal restraint measures short of formal treaties
Whether arms control regains momentum will depend on political will, threat perceptions, and domestic strategic debates within major powers.
What to Note for Prelims?
- New START (2010): Limited deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 each.
- START I (1991): First treaty mandating actual reductions (to 6,000 warheads).
- SALT (1970s): Focused on capping, not reducing, nuclear arsenals.
- NPT: Entered into force in 1970; recognises five nuclear weapon states.
- CTBT: Seeks to ban all nuclear test explosions (not yet in force).
What to Note for Mains?
- Evaluate the significance of bilateral arms control in maintaining global strategic stability.
- Discuss the challenges of transitioning from bipolar to multipolar nuclear deterrence.
- Examine the credibility crisis of the NPT in the absence of continued disarmament by major powers.
- Analyse whether inclusive multilateral frameworks are feasible in contemporary geopolitics.
