The Supreme Court of India recently put forth a noteworthy judgment concerning disqualification petitions under the tenth schedule. In an innovative move, it proposed that these disqualifications should be handled by a mechanism outside the Parliament or Legislative Assemblies. This would replace the current system wherein the Speaker of the House/Assembly is tasked with addressing this matter. The Court’s proposition includes the establishment of a permanent tribunal overseen by a retired Supreme Court judge or a former High Court Chief Justice. Such an amendment would necessitate a constitutional reform.
For the present scenario, the Court noted that Speakers ought to decide Tenth Schedule disqualifications within a “reasonable period,” with what is considered ‘reasonable’ hinging on the unique specifics of each case. The court mandated that barring “exceptional circumstances”, decisions on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule should be made by Speakers within three months.
The Rationale Behind Supreme Court’s Judgment
The Supreme Court raised pertinent questions about why a Speaker, who is part of a particular political party and an internal member of the House, should function as the “sole and final arbiter” in political defector disqualifications. Furthermore, it pondered over why these disqualification proceedings shouldn’t be handed over to an “outside” authority given that even the final authority for a judge’s removal lies outside the judiciary, in Parliament. The verdict emphasized that an expeditious and impartial disqualification of political defectors is what would truly fortify the Tenth Schedule’s purpose.
| Title | Description |
|---|---|
| Anti-Defection Law | Established in 1985 via the 52nd Constitutional Amendment |
| Main Objective | Combatting political defections |
| Conditions for Disqualification | Voluntarily giving up party membership or voting against party directives without prior permission and subsequent condonation within 15 days. |
Disqualification as per Tenth Schedule
The Anti-Defection Law, brought into force through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment in 1985, introduced the Tenth Schedule to the Indian Constitution. Aiming to combat “the evil of political defections”, this law sets the criteria for the disqualification of House members based on their political behaviour. A member faces disqualification if he voluntarily forsakes his party membership, or votes (or refrains from voting) contrary to party directives without securing prior approval, and isn’t pardoned by the party within a 15-day window.
Exceptions to Disqualification Due to Defection
The law makes allowances for two exceptions where disqualification on the grounds of defection doesn’t apply: When a member leaves his party due to a merger agreed upon by two-thirds of the party’s representatives; and when a member selected as the presiding officer of the House willingly relinquishes his party membership or re-joins it after his term ends. The latter exception is in recognition of the crucial role’s dignity and impartiality.
The Speaker’s Role Regarding Anti-Defection Law
The Anti-Defection Law posits that any question related to disqualification due to defection would be decided by the presiding officer of the House. But post the Kihoto Hollohan versus Zachilhu case (1993), the Supreme Court decreed that the presiding officer’s decision wasn’t final and could be subjected to legal scrutiny on grounds like malafide, perversity, and so on. This is the second instance in recent times that the Court has touched upon the issue of transferring the Tenth Schedule disqualification powers from the Speakers. In the Karnataka MLAs’ disqualification case too, it had ruled that a Speaker unable to resist the pressures and desires of his political party didn’t merit his position.
