The Iranian government’s declaration on January 12 that it had brought unrest under control has not ended global anxiety. Instead, attention has shifted to the United States, where President Donald Trump has issued a series of sharply contradictory statements—alternating between threats of military action, encouragement to Iranian protestors, and hints of negotiation. This oscillation has raised questions about Washington’s real options, Tehran’s strategy, and whether domestic protests genuinely factor into US calculations.
What Happened Inside Iran?
Following a communications blackout imposed on January 8, Iranian authorities claimed they had regained control over protests by January 12. While sporadic demonstrations have continued, there have been no reports of sustained, nationwide anti-regime mobilisation since then. The state narrative has drawn a distinction between peaceful protests and violent rioting, with the latter attributed to foreign-instigated elements.
Iran has also sought to project internal cohesion. Reformists and conservatives alike have supported the government’s crackdown on rioters, and the organisational unity of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has remained intact—an important factor preventing regime fragmentation.
Why Washington’s Messaging Has Been So Inconsistent
Between January 2 and January 16, Trump’s statements swung dramatically—from declaring the US “locked and ready” to help protestors, to announcing talks with Tehran, then cancelling them, and finally insisting that “all options remain on the table.” This inconsistency reflects deeper strategic uncertainty.
One reason is limited immediate military preparedness. With US naval assets stretched across regions—including the Caribbean and the South China Sea—Washington lacks the comfort of overwhelming force concentration in West Asia. Even as the USS Abraham Lincoln moved towards the Gulf, the US remained wary of escalation without clear political objectives.
America’s Military Options and Their Limits
Any US strike on Iran would likely rely on standoff capabilities—air and missile strikes—rather than ground intervention. However, there is little evidence that such action could achieve coherent strategic goals. Targeting Iranian government or Revolutionary Guard facilities does not guarantee regime change, nor does it ensure the emergence of a pro-US leadership in Tehran.
There is also no modern precedent for aerial intervention successfully supporting peaceful protests to topple a regime in a large, populous country with a cohesive military and no civil war. This reality sharply constrains Washington’s choices.
Regional Pressures Restraining the US
Key regional actors have quietly pushed against the prospect of war. Gulf states fear a destabilising regional conflict. The UAE remains one of Iran’s largest trading partners, while Saudi Arabia is focused on economic diversification and regional calm. These anxieties reduce the diplomatic space for American escalation.
At the same time, Washington may still feel compelled to demonstrate credibility—to show that its threats are not empty. This creates the risk of a limited strike followed by symbolic Iranian retaliation.
Iran’s Dual Strategy: Deterrence and Dialogue
For Tehran, economic survival is inseparable from foreign policy. Relief from Western sanctions is critical amid currency collapse and looming economic crisis. Engagement with the US is therefore unavoidable.
Yet Iran is also preparing for confrontation. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that Iran is ready both for war and for dialogue. Tehran has warned that any American attack would trigger responses against US and Israeli targets, while simultaneously keeping diplomatic backchannels open—most notably through Oman, a long-standing intermediary.
Do the Protests Justify US Military Action?
US rhetoric has often linked potential military action to supporting Iranian protestors. This rests on two assumptions: that protestors overwhelmingly reject the political system itself, and that external military pressure would decisively aid their cause.
Evidence for either is weak. Iran has acknowledged a high death toll but has worked to control the narrative by highlighting violence against public infrastructure and staging pro-regime demonstrations. It has also invoked foreign conspiracy narratives, citing alleged intelligence penetration and external encouragement of unrest.
Importantly, Iranian society retains a long historical memory, including the 1953 US–UK-backed coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. External military action risks triggering nationalist solidarity rather than regime collapse.
Why Outcomes Remain Deeply Uncertain
Both Washington and Tehran are projecting dual positions—threatening force while signalling openness to dialogue. This mutual ambiguity reduces the likelihood of full-scale war but increases the risk of miscalculation.
Just as the trajectory of Iran’s protests remains unclear, so too does the effectiveness of any US military action. What is evident is that neither side has a clean path to victory, and escalation could deepen instability without resolving underlying political or economic crises.
What to Note for Prelims?
- Iran imposed a communications blackout on January 8 to control unrest.
- US moved assets from Al Udeid airbase amid fears of retaliation.
- Oman continues to act as a key intermediary between the US and Iran.
- Iran combines deterrence with diplomatic engagement.
What to Note for Mains?
- Limits of external military intervention in triggering regime change.
- Role of regional actors in restraining great power conflict.
- Interaction between domestic protests and foreign policy narratives.
- Strategic ambiguity as a tool—and risk—in international relations.
