The Karnataka High Court recently issued a notice to the Indian Union government, addressing a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) petition. The focus of this PIL concerns the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 that marks behaviour or speech “scandalising the court” as grounds for contempt. This has spurred a debate regarding the constitutional validity of this provision and the potential threat it may pose to freedom of speech and judicial transparency.
Understanding the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
Contempt is defined as an act that disrespects or undermines the dignity and authority of the court. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides a framework for this concept, though it does not offer a concrete definition itself. Instead, specific details can be found within the Constitution. Article 129 grants the Supreme Court the power to penalize contemptuous actions, with Article 215 offering similar powers to the High Courts.
This act distinguishes civil contempt, which involves willful disobedience to any judgement of the court, from criminal contempt. Criminal contempt can encompass a variety of actions, including those that scandalise or lower the court’s authority, interfere with judicial proceedings, or obstruct the administration of justice.
The act was revised in 2006 to permit truth as a valid defence, if deemed in public interest. It also sets a condition that “fair criticism” of a finally decided case wouldn’t amount to contempt. However, the parameters for what constitutes “fair” are left to the judges’ discretion.
Arguments and Concerns Raised by Petitioners
The petitioners argue that the act’s delineation of “scandalizing the court” as grounds for contempt encroaches upon the right to free speech and expression as per Article 19(1)(a). In addition, they state that this provision doesn’t align with the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
While they don’t contest the constitutionality of the other sections pertaining to criminal contempt, the petitioners imply that these actions need further clarification and should be guided by rules and principles that uphold natural justice and fairness.
The petitioners express concerns that in contempt cases, judges could appear to be acting in their own interest, which could undermine the principles of natural justice and reduce public confidence.
Highlighted Issues
Several critical issues have been brought to light through this debate. The term ‘scandalising’ is subjective to the individual’s perspective, leading to potential arbitrariness when interpreting and enforcing this law. Critics argue that this provision may be exploited to target personal attacks on judges, disregarding the law’s purpose of safeguarding the institution of the judiciary.
Further, there are concerns that this provision might encroach on freedom of expression, a fundamental right in a democratic society. Comparisons have been drawn to the United Kingdom, where “scandalising the judiciary” as a means of contempt of court was abolished in 2013, citing it infringed upon freedom of speech.
Another fundamental principle of natural justice, the rule against bias which states that no man shall be a judge in his own cause, arguably gets violated in the contempt proceedings.
Way Forward
Safeguarding freedom of speech is crucial, with restrictions needing to be minimal and justifiable. The law of contempt is intended to protect the legitimacy of judicial institutions, not individual judges. Issuing a contempt notice without proper scrutiny can potentially cause significant hardship, especially to those engaged in public life.
In the modern context, accountability and transparency within courts are pivotal. Allegations should be assuaged through impartial investigations rather than threats of contempt action. Therefore, it’s important to have the balance right between protecting the dignity of the court and allowing legitimate scrutiny and criticism.
