The announcement of the US-led “Pax Silica” initiative — aimed at securing supply chains in critical minerals, energy, semiconductors and artificial intelligence — has drawn attention not just for who is included, but for who is not. India’s absence from this grouping, especially when the initiative is widely seen as countering China, raises uncomfortable questions about India’s position in today’s transactional geopolitics.
A multilateral initiative from a multilateral sceptic
That Pax Silica emerged under the leadership of Donald Trump is itself noteworthy. Trump has been consistently sceptical of multilateral institutions such as the UN, NATO, the G7 and the G20, often viewing them as constraints rather than assets. Pax Silica, however, is not multilateralism in the traditional sense. It is a narrowly focused, interest-driven coalition designed to secure strategic supply chains vital to 21st-century power.
Its nine members — the US, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, the UK, the Netherlands, Israel, the UAE and Australia — are not bound by shared values alone, but by what each tangibly contributes.
Why India’s exclusion is not an anomaly
At first glance, India’s exclusion appears puzzling. Strategically, India is often described as a natural counterweight to China. But Pax Silica is not about geopolitical symbolism; it is about geo-economic capability.
Each participating country brings either:
- Advanced technological capacity (semiconductors, AI, high-end manufacturing), or
- Strategic resources such as energy and critical minerals.
India, at present, brings neither at scale. It is not even among the “guest” countries like Canada (resource-rich) or Taiwan (semiconductor powerhouse). In a transactional framework, potential counts far less than deliverables.
The R&D deficit and the innovation gap
India’s marginal role in high-technology supply chains reflects long-term neglect. India spends only about 0.6–0.7% of its GDP on research and development — a figure that has stagnated for nearly two decades. In comparison, the US and China spend around 3% and 2.5% respectively, while South Korea and Israel approach 5%.
This gap explains why India has not emerged as a global product or innovation hub. With the partial exception of space technology, India remains largely a service provider rather than a creator of cutting-edge technologies that define contemporary power politics.
Minerals: rich geology, poor outcomes
A similar story unfolds in the minerals sector. India possesses geological potential comparable to Australia, yet has explored only 25–30% of it. The consequences are stark:
- 90% dependence on oil and gas imports
- Near-total import dependence for gold, copper ore and lithium
- Even imports of coal and bauxite, despite domestic availability
Mining contributes just about 2% to India’s GDP, compared to 8–10% in countries with similar geological endowments. This is not a resource problem, but a policy and execution problem.
Policy focus on allocation, not discovery
India’s mineral policy debate has historically focused on allocation mechanisms — from first-come-first-serve to auctions — and government revenue. These debates matter only after resources are discovered.
The real challenge lies upstream: exploration. Most of India’s mineral wealth remains underground and unmapped. The government alone cannot shoulder this task. Private exploration will happen only if investors are allowed to freely monetise discoveries without excessive state intervention.
Geopolitics now follows geo-economics
Pax Silica underlines a broader shift: global influence today flows from economic capability, not just strategic positioning. If India wants a seat at the high table, it must be a player in critical supply chains — not merely a geopolitical “swing state”.
There is a possible third route: India’s large domestic market. Opening it decisively could attract strategic interest even from transactional partners. But domestic political economy constraints push India towards caution and protectionism, as seen in prolonged and hesitant trade negotiations with the US.
From potential to performance
For years, India has relied on its potential — demographic scale, economic size, and strategic location — to command global relevance. Pax Silica reflects a harsher reality: today’s geopolitics rewards what exists, not what may emerge.
India’s time is not over. Its potential remains intact. But without urgency in R&D investment, mineral exploration, and market reform, India will continue to watch new global arrangements form from the outside.
What to note for Prelims?
- Pax Silica focuses on semiconductors, AI, energy and critical minerals.
- India spends about 0.6–0.7% of GDP on R&D.
- Mining contributes only ~2% to India’s GDP.
- India is 100% import-dependent for lithium.
What to note for Mains?
- Shift from geopolitics to geo-economics in global power structures.
- Link between R&D spending and strategic autonomy.
- Structural weaknesses in India’s minerals and technology policies.
- Limits of “strategic potential” without economic delivery.
